BEFORE THE STATE
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
FOR THE STATE OF
IN THE MATTER OF
THE APPEAL OF )
MOUNTAIN CEMENT COMPANY FROM )
A DECISION OF THE
ALBANY COUNTY ) Docket
EQUALIZATION -2002 )
PROPERTY VALUATION )
DECISION AND ORDER
Lawrence J. Wolfe,
and Michael D. Smith, Holland & Hart LLP, representing Mountain Cement Company,
(Petitioner). Alan Poe, Holland & Hart LLP, represented Petitioner at the County Board
of Equalization Hearing.
Schermetzler, Deputy County and Prosecuting Attorney, Albany County, for Deborah J.
Nagel-Smith, Albany County Assessor, (Assessor). Cal Rerucha, Albany County Attorney,
represented the Assessor at the County Board of Equalization Hearing.
This is an appeal
of a decision from the Albany County Board of Equalization (County Board). The State Board
of Equalization (State Board), comprised of Roberta A. Coates, Chairman, Alan B. Minier,
Vice-Chairman, Thomas R. Satterfield, Board Member, considered the hearing record and
decision of the County Board, briefs filed pursuant to a Briefing Order (Locally Assessed
Property), dated March 31, 2003, and oral arguments heard on May 30, 2003. The Petitioner
appealed a decision of the County Board affirming the Albany County Assessor’s corrected
2002 valuation of the real property and improvements of Mountain Cement Company, Laramie,
Albany County, Wyoming. The Assessor determined the value of the subject property to be
$40,269,620.00. Petitioner asks the State Board to remand this case to the County Board
with a directive that Petitioner’s property and improvements be assessed at a value of
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
The County Board
conducted a hearing on November 22, 2002, with Hearing Officer James Wolfe presiding. The
Petitioner called four witnesses, Michael David Seaton, John S. Wittmayer, Leigh Anne
Marchant and Rod Cummickel. The Assessor called three witnesses, Deborah J. Smith, Cheri
Anderle Frank and Robert Lehn. Two volumes of documents were admitted into the record.
The County Board’s
findings of fact focused on the appraisal process, and on the taxpayer’s role in
providing information necessary to prepare that appraisal. The Assessor had employed a
registered professional appraiser to conduct an industrial appraisal of the Petitioner’s
property for the year ending December 31, 2001. The appraisal process commenced on October
23, 2001, with a prearranged site inspection. Petitioner expressed concerns about the
accuracy of property listed in the prior year’s appraisal, and expressed an intention to
provide additions and deletions to correct the information in the prior appraisal.
Petitioner submitted proposed corrections on March 1, 2002. After receiving the details of
the resulting appraisal in late April, Petitioner filed an appeal which incorporated new
corrections. The County Board concluded that the Petitioner had failed to provide a
complete listing of its private property by the statutory deadline of March 1, and upheld
the Assessor’s valuation, which was based on the “best available information at the
The State Board is
required to “hear appeals from county boards of equalization.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. §
39-11-102.1(c). A timely appeal from the County Board decision was filed with the
State Board. Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 3, §2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the State
Board hears appeals from a county board, it acts as an intermediate level of appellate
review. Laramie County Board of Equalization v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization,
915 P.2d 1184, 1188 (Wyo. 1996); Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Wyoming State Board
of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 859 (Wyo. 1990). In its appellate capacity, the State
Board treats the county board as the finder of fact. Id. In contrast, the State
Board acts as the finder of fact when it hears contested cases on appeal from final
decisions of the Wyoming Department of Revenue. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c). This
sharp distinction in roles is reflected in the State Board Rules governing the two
different types of proceedings. Compare Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization,
Chapter 2 and Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 3. Statutory
language first adopted in 1995, when the Board of Equalization and the Department of
Revenue were reorganized into separate entities, does not express the distinction between
the State Board’s appellate and de novo capacities with the same clarity as our
long-standing Rules. 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Chapter 209, Section 1, §39-1-304(a).
By rule, the State
Board’s standards for review of a county board’s decision are nearly identical to the
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act standards which a district court must apply to hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. Wyo.
Stat. Ann. §16-3-114(c)(ii), Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 3 §9. However,
unlike a district court, the Board will not rule on claims that a county board has acted
“[c]ontrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity.” Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§16-1-114(c)(ii)(B). The State Board’s review is limited to a determination of
whether the county board action is:
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(b) In excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;
observance of procedure required by law; or
(d) Unsupported by
State Board of Equalization, Chapter 3, § 9.
Since the State
Board Rules are patterned on the judicial review provision of the Wyoming Administrative
Procedures Act, we look to precedent under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §16-3-114(c) for guidance. For
example, we must apply this substantial evidence standard:
Our task is to
examine the entire record to determine if substantial evidence exists to support the
[county board’s] findings. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the [county
board] if [its] decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency’s
Clark v. State
ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 934 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Wyo.
initially identified five defects in the County Board’s decision. [Petitioner’s Notice
of Appeal, pp. 2 & 3]. The Assessor’s Brief condensed these to two. [Response Brief
of Respondent Albany County Assessor, p. 5]. We have reorganized these to three issues.
A. Whether the
value assigned is excessive because some items may be used for a different purpose than
was intended or may not be present on the Petitioner’s property? We find the County
Board was not arbitrary and capricious and there was substantial evidence to support their
conclusion. Petitioner presented evidence that the list it filed with the Assessor on
March 1 was incorrect, however there is a statutory deadline for taxpayers to submit
information to the Assessor. Thus the County Board was obligated to consider the
information submitted on March 1 and not the information submitted later.
B. Whether the
Assessor failed to fully and properly allow for a pollution control equipment exemption?
We find the Petitioner failed to carry its burden of proof and the County Board was not
arbitrary and capricious in accepting the Assessor’s value.
C. Whether the
County Board erred in upholding the Assessor’s valuation as based on the “best
information available”; and in not considering evidence presented at the hearing?
Petitioner presented evidence that the list it filed with the Assessor on March 1 was
incorrect, however there is a statutory deadline for taxpayers to submit information to
the Assessor. Thus the County Board was obligated to consider the information submitted on
March 1 and not the information submitted later.
We have organized
our review of the County Board decision around these three issues.
FACTS PRESENTED TO THE
1. Petitioner, owns
a cement plant located along U.S. Highway 287, south of Laramie, Albany County, Wyoming.
[County Board Record, p. 147].
2. A hearing on the
appeal was held by the County Board of Equalization on November 22, 2002. [Transcript pp.
3. Petitioner filed
the first appeal on May 23, 2002. [Assessor’s Exhibit 28; Transcript, pp. 153-159]. This
appeal was made before Petitioner had received the revised assessment for the 2002 tax
appealed the Assessor’s revised assessed valuation of May 23, 2002 to the County Board
on June 20, 2002. The appeal referred to the value of the improvements and personal
property and value of the pollution control exemption, but not the land. The June 7, 2002,
letter from Mr. Cummickel with fourteen pages of information with Petitioner’s notations
were attached to the appeal. [Assessor’s Exhibit 33, p. 201; Transcript, p. 653].
PERSONAL PROPERTY INVENTORY
5. The Assessor
hired Thomas Y. Pickett & Company to identify, locate and appraise by on-site
inspection the property of Petitioner and report the information to her. Thomas Y. Pickett
& Co. was engaged by the State of Wyoming in 1986 to reappraise all industrial
properties in the state. The values obtained in 1986 have been adjusted annually since
that time, and so the 1986 information provided the foundation for all subsequent
appraisals. The appraiser assigned to the project was Mr. Robert Lehn. Mr. Lehn has
appraised industrial property extensively in the State of Wyoming. [Transcript pp. 608,
6. Mr. Lehn and
Cheri Anderle Frank, property tax appraiser for the Assessor, arranged a meeting with
Petitioner. The purpose of the meeting was to review additions and deletions to the
property listed in the prior year’s appraisal and to make a field inspection of the
plant, in preparation for the 2002 assessment. [Transcript, p. 628]. Ms. Leigh Anne
Marchant, controller for Petitioner, Mr. Alan R. Poe, an attorney for Petitioner, Mr. Norm
Gilbertson, Petitioner’s plant manager, Mr. Lehn and Ms. Frank were present for the
field inspection meeting. [Transcript p. 580].
7. At the meeting,
Mr. Lehn specifically asked if there were any property additions or deletions. Mr. Lehn
was shown an old disassembled kiln and one piece of machinery that they housed in a
storage building. Ms. Marchant was concerned about items on the appraisal sheet from the
2001 report that did not match with Petitioner’s fixed asset records. Ms. Marchant
stated that Petitioner would review all of their records of property and submit additional
deletions. [Transcript, pp. 632-633].
8. Mr. Lehn said
his company, Thomas Y. Pickett, began to collect information on the personal property
schedule of Petitioner’s plant in 1986 when the owner was Portland Monolith Company. He
explained the figures for calculated depreciation and physical obsolescence and other
factors to arrive at a fair market value for the plant. [Transcript, p. 668].
9. Ms. Marchant
testified how difficult it was for her to correlate Petitioner’s fixed asset list with
the list furnished by Thomas Y. Pickett & Company. She even hired an outside
accountant to try to match up the two lists, without success. There proved to be very few
items that she could readily match up and identify from Petitioner’s records.
[Transcript, p. 577].
10. Ms. Marchant
submitted the Personal Property Inventory on March 1, 2002, to the Assessor. This document
included three pages of additions and deletions, construction in progress,
reclassifications, repair part inventory, estimated completion or dates placed in service,
income and expense statements, and capital structure information, all based on the best
information she had at the time. Although Ms. Marchant testified that it was difficult to
correlate the list of Petitioner with the Thomas Y. Pickett & Company list we note the
list she submitted on March 1 contained references to the control numbers assigned by
Thomas Y. Pickett & Company on their list. [Assessor’s Exhibit 21; Transcript, p.
563]. The Assessor accepted this information and adjusted the personal property list for
the assessment. [Assessor’s Exhibits 22, 23].
11. Ms. Marchant
submitted the March 1 list based on the annual inventory adjustment she prepared for
Petitioner’s internal use. [Transcript, p. 668]. Petitioner did not ask for an extension
of time to expand on the information that was submitted to the Assessor. [Transcript, p.
12. Mr. Lehn
submitted a report that valued the property of Petitioner at a fair market value of
$42,300,870 using Petitioner’s March 1, 2002 list. Mr. Lehn did adjust his information
with the information Petitioner provided on March 1 because the items Ms. Marchant changed
were changed on Lehn’s final recommendation. [Compare Assessor’s Exhibits 21, 22, 23].
13. Mr. Lehn used
the cost valuation method to value Petitioner’s property. Using this method required
Lehn to have the acquisition cost of each item and adjust that cost for all forms of
depreciation to derive a value for each item. Using the cost method each item and its
value is important because the final valuation is the same for all industrial items. When
using the cost method it is therefore important to have reliable information provided for
each item. Lehn did not use any other method to determine value so we can conclude the
information for each item was important. [Transcript, pp. 668-672].
14. Mr. Lehn sent
the list of items assessed, the value he assigned and the information about the amount he
was recommending for exemption for pollution control to Petitioner for review on Friday,
April 19, 2002. He asked for a response by Monday, April 22, 2002. From a review of the
exhibits we cannot find that Petitioner responded to Mr. Lehn. [Assessor’s Exhibit 22,
15. The Petitioner
argued that failure to meet statutory deadline of March 1 did not warrant the harsh
penalty of not allowing adjustments in the final valuation for new lists that excluded
other items. However, 2002 was not the first year that Thomas Y. Pickett had asked
Petitioner for a list of any personal items that had been added or subtracted from their
inventory. Mr. Robert Lehn testified that his company had been involved with the plant
since 1986 and that year was the starting point for accumulating their assessment
information. [Transcript, p.668].
16. The Assessor
accepted Mr. Lehn’s value for pollution control exemption and subtracted it from the
fair market value of $42,300,870 that Thomas Y. Picket & Co. had given as the final
appraised value. Adding the land value computed by the Assessor’s office. The adjusted
total value of Petitioner’s property for the tax year 2002 was $40,269,620. The Assessor
issued an Assessment Notice for Petitioner’s property on April 25, 2002. [Assessor’s
Exhibit 25, p.146 ]. Both Mrs. Frank and the Assessor testified that there had been
computer problems when the assessment schedules were sent out on April 25, 2002. However
the Assessor’s office was not aware of any problem with Petitioner’s assessment until
Petitioner informed the Assessor that the assessed value given to them was for the
previous tax year 2001 and not 2002. There was actually a two million dollar difference
between the two years. The revised assessment was sent May 23, 2002. [Assessor’s Exhibit
29, p. 160; Transcript, p. 643].
17. Petitioner sent
a marked up copy of the Thomas Y. Pickett fourteen page 2002 appraisal received from Mr.
Lehn on April 19th, to the Assessor’s office on June 7, 2002. [Transcript, p. 653;
Assessor’s Exhibit 32, pp. 184-200]. This list contained personal property items that
were marked with notations for approximately seventy line items. Examples of the notations
were; “not here, probably not here, gone, no longer here, out of service, not in
service, delete, no longer used, environmental, county road, private road, redone, raw
mill, and converted to bag house.” It is important to note that none of the items Petitioner complained about on the June
7 list was an issue on the March 1 list prepared by Petitioner. [Compare Assessor’s
Exhibits 21, 32].
later amended its June 7 list to raise new items new lists were prepared in September,
2002. [Petitioner’s Exhibit 10 (Mountain Cement Company Major Equipment List) and
Petitioner’s Exhibit 11 (Mountain Cement Company Building’s Structure List);
Transcript, pp. 459-462].
19. The County
Board denied Petitioner’s protest and affirmed the Assessor’s corrected valuation of
Petitioner’s property using Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39-13-103(b)(v) as the basis for the
decision. The County Board issued its decision on January 7, 2003. [County Board Record,
appealed to the State Board by Notice of Appeal filed February 5, 2003. [County Board
Record pp. 720-725].
POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT EXEMPTION:
21. As the
controller for Petitioner, Ms. Marchant was responsible for the paper work for the
pollution control exemption. The statutory deadline for the return of the pollution
control form is February 15. She asked and was granted an extension of ten days from
February 14th to February 25th, 2002. [Assessor’s Exhibit 21;
Transcript, p. 596]. On February 25, 2002, Ms. Marchant requested additional time for
turning in the pollution control forms. The reason given was because of Petitioner’s
recent changes in the environmental management position. The Assessor granted another ten
day extension. [Assessor’s Exhibits 19, p.79 and 20, p. 80]. The pollution control forms
were submitted to the Assessor on March 1, 2002. [Transcript, p. 598].
22. With the
information furnished by Petitioner on March 1, 2002, Mr. Lehn valued the pollution
equipment exemption at $2,147,950 and gave the information to the Assessor on April 23,
2002. [Assessor’s Exhibit 24, p. 142]. By comparing the forms submitted by Petitioner
and the schedule prepared by Lehn, it is obvious Lehn considered and acted upon the
information submitted by Petitioner. [Assessor’s Exhibit 24, pp.144-145]. Petitioner
questions the amount of exemption assigned by Lehn but failed to present any evidence,
either through cross-examination or by direct testimony, to attack the judgment of Lehn.
The appeal of the pollution control exemption was rarely mentioned in the hearing
claim that the amount allowed for pollution control deduction was too low, is not
supported by facts. Petitioner did not call any expert witnesses or other appraisers to
contradict the Thomas Y. Pickett figures. The Assessor, through Thomas Y. Pickett, allowed
a pollution control deduction based on percentage of use. The Petitioner did not present
any information to the contrary and thus failed to carry its burden of proof. [Assessor’s
Exhibit 24; Transcript p. 661].
24. Based of the
record before us, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the
County Board concerning pollution control equipment exemption. We decline to substitute
our judgement of the facts for that of the County Board. We likewise conclude that the
Petitioner did not overcome the presumption in favor of the Assessor’s valuation of the
pollution control equipment exemption.
APPLICABLE LAW AND PETITIONER’S ISSUES
25. Article 15,
Section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution requires all property “be uniformly assessed for
taxation, and the legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just
valuation of taxation of all property, real and personal.”
Early on, Justice
Blume recognized a truth inherent in the area of property valuation: ‘There is no such
thing as absolute value. A stone cannot be other than a stone, but one man may give a
different valuation to a piece of land than another.’ Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing
Ass’n, 29 Wyo. 461, 475, 215 P. 244, 248 (1923). Accordingly, this court has
consistently interpreted Wyo. Const. Art. 15, § 11 to require ‘only a rational method
[of appraisal], equally applied to all property which results in essential fairness.’
Power Coop. v. Dept. of Revenue, 970 P.2d 841, 857 (Wyo. 1998) quoting: Holly Sugar
Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 839 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo. 1992).
26. Broken into its
component parts, the constitutional standard requires (1) a rational method; (2) equally
applied to all property; and (3) essential fairness. It is the burden of one challenging
an assessment to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of these
elements has not been fulfilled. Basin Electric Power Corp., 970 P.2d at 852.
27. All property
must be valued annually at fair market value. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39-13-103(b)(ii). Further,
all taxable property must be valued and assessed for taxation in the name of the owner of
the property on January 1. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39-13-103(b)(i)(A).
28. Fair market
value is defined as:
amount in cash, or terms reasonably equivalent to cash, a well informed buyer is justified
in paying for a property, and a well informed seller is justified in accepting, assuming
neither party to the transaction is acting under undue compulsion, and assuming the
property has been offered in the open market for a reasonably time.
Wyo. Stat. Ann.
29. The Department
has promulgated rules prescribing the methods for valuing property. The acceptable methods
include a cost approach. Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 9, § 6 (a),
(b), (c), and (d).
30. An Assessor’s
valuation is presumed valid, accurate, and correct. This presumption survives until
overturned by credible evidence. Teton Valley Ranch v. State Board of Equalization, 735
P.2d 107, 113 (Wyo. 1987). A mere difference of opinion as to value is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption. J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Hudson, 370 P.2d 364, 370
31. Wyoming Statute
Annotated 39-13-103(b)(v) states:
assessor or deputy assessor as provided by W.S. 39-13-102(a) shall obtain from each
property owner or person having control of the taxable property in the assessment district
for which they were appointed, a full, complete and detailed statement of the amount of
the taxable property owned by or subject to the control of the property owner. If a
property owner fails to provide a listing of personal property owned by him or under his
control by March 1, unless an extension is granted
from the assessor in writing, the assessor shall issue an assessment from the best
information available. The county assessor shall extend the date for listing personal
property from March 1 to April 1 upon written request of the property owner provided the
written request is made not later than February 15 . . .. (Emphasis added)
Although there were
extensions granted to Petitioner to allow the late submission of a listing of pollution
control equipment exemption, there were no extensions requested by the Petitioner for
submission of personal property listing. In fact, on March 1 Petitioner submitted a list
of equipment that was deleted from the Assessor’s list. The Petitioner provided no more
information about personal property until it filed an appeal.
32. It is important
to understand the time constraints outlined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39-13-103 and their
(A) All property is
valued as of January 1st. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39-13-103(b)(i)(A).
(B) Wyoming Statute
the county assessor
shall obtain from each property owner... a full, complete and detailed statement of the
amount of the taxable property owned by or subject to the control of the property owner.
If a property owner fails to provide a listing of personal property owned by him or under
his control by March 1, assessment of personal
property from the best information available . . .. (Emphasis added).
statement is to be submitted under oath.
should be complete to produce assessment schedules before the fourth Monday in April. Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§39-13-103(b)(vii). From the assessments schedules the assessor produces an abstract
for acceptance by the county board of equalization and the State Board of Equalization.
(D) Abstracts are
due to the State of Wyoming Board of Equalization on June
first. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39-13-102(e). From the abstract information mill
levies are set on the first Monday in August and
after those have been certified the tax rolls and tax bills can be prepared. Wyo. Stat.
reviews property with the owner in October of each year.
33. Although the
statutory burden to report is framed in terms of all property owners, statutory exemptions
limit the practical effect of the obligation. For example, the statute generally exempts
personal property held for personal or family use from taxation. Wyo. Stat. Ann.
34. Each of the
issues raised by the Petitioner turn on the question of whether or not there is
substantial evidence in the record that reasonably supports the County Board decision. In
determining whether or not there is substantial evidence in the record, the State Board
will not substitute its judgment for findings reasonably supported by evidence in the
County Board record. Laramie County Board of Equalization, 915 P.2d at 1188-1189; Holly
Sugar Corp. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 839 P.2d 959, (Wyo. 1992); Amax
Coal v. State Board of Equalization, 819 P.2d 825 (Wyo. 1991); Sage Club, Inc.
Employment Sec. Comm’n., 601 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Wyo. 1979). While substantial evidence
may be less than the weight of the evidence, it cannot be clearly contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated, “[s]ubstantial
evidence is a term of art best described as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind can
accept as adequate support for an agency’s conclusion.” Sidwell v. State Workers’
Compensation Div., 977 P.2d 60, 63 (Wyo. 1999).
35. The party
challenging sufficiency of evidence has the burden of demonstrating the agency’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Laramie County Board of Equalization,
915 P2d at 1184,1188 (Wyo. 1996).
36. There is
substantial evidence to support the Assessor’s determination of the pollution control
exemption, and Petitioner has failed to carry its burden of proof to show that the
Assessor’s determination was incorrect. In fact, Petitioner failed to present
information about the value of pollution control equipment either through direct evidence
37. Wyoming Statute
Annotated §39-13-103(b)(v) uses the word “shall” for the deadline of March 1 to
obtain a listing of personal property. “Shall” is mandatory and therefore the deadline
demands compliance. There are no exceptions. Bellamy v. Bellamy, 949 P.2d 875 (
Wyo. 1997); Russell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation
Division, 944 P.2d 1151 (Wyo. 1991); and State by and Through Department of Family
Services v. Jennings, 818 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 1991). It is mandatory that a list of
personal property be provided to the Assessor, a list after the deadline does not meet the
requirements of the statute. The Assessor utilized all the information Petitioner
submitted on or before the deadline of March 1. There is substantial evidence that all the
items appealed by Petitioner were items that were not contested on March 1. The County
Board was justified in enforcing a mandatory deadline and not considering new items not
raised by March 1.
failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the Assessor’s valuation was not reached
by a rational method of appraisal, equally applied to all like industrial property which
resulted in essential fairness and reasonable estimate of the fair market value of the
39. Based on the
record before us, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the
County Board. We decline to substitute our judgement of the facts for that of the County
Board. We likewise conclude that on all points, the Petitioner did not overcome the
presumption in favor of the Assessor’s valuation.
40. The decision of
the County Board affirming the Assessor’s corrected value of the Petitioner’s property
was supported by substantial evidence, was in accordance with procedures required by law,
and was neither arbitrary, capricious nor inconsistent with law.
IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED that the Albany County
Board of Equalization Order denying the Petitioner’s protest and affirming the 2002
assessment of Petitioner’s property located at along U. S. Highway 287 south of Laramie
in Albany County, Wyoming is affirmed.
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 and Rule 12, Wyoming
Rules of Appellate Procedure, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by this
decision may seek judicial review in at the appropriate district court by filing a
petition for review within 30 days of the date of this decision.
this 29th day of October, 2003
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
A. Coates, Chairman
B. Minier, Vice-Chairman
Satterfield, Board Member
Wendy J. Soto,