The State Board heard oral
argument on July 7, 2009.BEFORE THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
FOR THE STATE OF WYOMING
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF )
SAND CREEK DEVELOPMENT )
SERVICES, III, INC., et al., FROM ) Docket No. 2009-15
A DECISION OF THE JOHNSON COUNTY )
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION - 2008 )
PROPERTY VALUATION )
DECISION AND ORDER
APPEARANCES
Nancy D. Freudenthal and Clint A. Langer, Davis & Cannon, LLP, appeared on behalf of Sand Creek Development Services, III, Inc.; Cheri C. Harriet; William H. and S. Colleen Payne; Beth D. Buffington and Ronald D. Anzalone; Olin L. Turner Declaration of Trust dated June 13, 2001, Olin L. Turner and Lynne R. Turner, Co-Trustees; Lynne R. Turner Declaration of Trust dated June 13, 2001, Olin L. Turner and Lynne R. Turner, Co-Trustees; END-IRA Inc. FBO Marc Randal Strahn, IRA # 07072054; James M. Rupp and Susan L. Rupp; Wayne E. and Sandra M. Nelson; Theresa M. Anderson; John G. Jenkins and Carol Voigt Jenkins (Taxpayers).
Christopher M. Wages, Johnson County and Prosecuting Attorney, and Barry Crago, Deputy Johnson County and Prosecuting Attorney, appeared on behalf of Dorothy Elsom, Johnson County Assessor (Assessor).
ISSUES
Taxpayers’ Opening Brief sets out these issues:
1.Given the undisputed evidence that (1) the Johnson County Assessor (Assessor) failed to read the warranty deeds or any of the recorded documents referenced in the deeds to understand the interests owned by Petitioners (Taxpayers); (2) Assessor failed to verify the sales while wrongfully indicating that such sales were verified; (3) Assessor disregarded the fact that Taxpayers each own two interests – an exempt corporate interest as a member of Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association, Inc. (the Corporation or Association) and a taxable fee interest in a one-acre lot; (4) Assessor disregarded all corrected statements of consideration filed by Taxpayers to clarify the consideration paid for “other property,” namely the corporate interest; and (5) Assessor disregarded the comparability between Taxpayers’ one-acre lots and every farmstead and neighboring rural residential lot in Johnson County:
a. The finding that the notice of assessment was “based on the best information available to Assessor in accordance with the Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) system” is unsupported by substantial evidence. Appendix VIII, CBOE Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶ 4.
b. The finding that “these sales were verified through the statements of consideration and conversations with John Jenkins,” the ranch landowner and developer at Sand Creek, is unsupported by substantial evidence. FOF ¶ 7(c).
c. The finding that “valid sales were entered in the CAMA system” is unsupported by substantial evidence. FOF ¶ 7(e).
d. The finding that “there are no Land Economic Areas (LEA) (sic) in Johnson County which are comparable to Sand Creek” is unsupported by substantial evidence. FOF ¶ 7(f).
e. The finding that “the CAMA system established a fair market value of $168,639.00” for a one-acre lot is unsupported by substantial evidence. FOF ¶ 7(g).
f. The finding that “Assessor had no other option for valuing the lots within Sand Creek” is unsupported by substantial evidence. FOF ¶ 7(h).
g. The finding that “the membership in [the Corporation] is an intangible characteristic which contributes to the value of the real property” is unsupported by substantial evidence. FOF ¶ 7(i).
2. Given the undisputed evidence that the corporate interest is distinct and separate exempt personal property owned by each Taxpayer for personal use, was it an error of law for the County Board of Equalization (CBOE) to conclude the corporate interest is an intangible characteristic which contributes to the fair market value of each lot? Appendix VIII, CBOE Conclusions of Law (COL) ¶15.
3. By relying on a Department of Revenue (DOR) exemption rule that was not in effect on January 1, 2008 and otherwise doesn’t apply to personal property held for personal use, was it an error of law for the CBOE to conclude Taxpayers were required to follow the procedures in DOR Rules and Regulations, Chapter 14, for an exemption of the corporate interest? COL ¶16.
4. Was it an error of law for the CBOE to conclude the subject property was assessed in accordance with Wyoming law, DOR Rules and Regulations and State Board of Equalization directives? COL ¶¶ 14 & 17.
5. Is the CBOE decision arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law in not giving consideration to legally binding restrictions and market factors which affect the value of Taxpayers’ taxable property?
6. Is the CBOE decision arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law in taxing the land owned by the Corporation plus the corporate interest owned by Taxpayers, given that such an action effectively results in double taxation?
7. Is the CBOE decision arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law in giving weight to conclusions reached by a DOR employee where there was no foundation for his testimony?
8. Is the CBOE decision arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law in that it results in an unconstitutional discrimination?
[Taxpayers’ Opening Brief, pp. 1-4].
The Assessor’s Response Brief listed four issues:
A. Whether the Johnson County Board of Equalization’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law.
B. Whether the Johnson County Board of Equalization’s decision was in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitation or lacking statutory right.
C. Whether the Johnson County Board of Equalization failed to observe procedure required by law.
D. Whether the Johnson County Board of Equalization’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
[Johnson County Assessor’s Response Brief, p. 1].
DIGEST
This is an appeal from a decision of the Johnson County Board of Equalization (County Board) affirming the Assessor’s 2008 valuation of Taxpayers’ property. Taxpayers’ Notice of Appeal was filed with the State Board of Equalization (State Board) effective January 30, 2009. The Assessor and Taxpayers filed briefs as allowed by the State Board Briefing Order dated February 27, 2009, as amended March 20, 2009. Taxpayers requested oral argument by motion dated March 23, 2009.
Taxpayers, by motion dated April 8, 2009, also requested the County Board Record in this matter be supplemented by the State Board taking notice, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-108(d), of certain exhibits and testimony in the appeal to the State Board by Mountain Holding, Inc., State Board Docket No. 2008-83. The Board denied the request for supplementation by order dated April 22, 2009.
The State Board, comprised of Thomas D. Roberts, Chairman, and Steven D. Olmstead,
Vice-Chairman, considered the parties’ filings, the hearing record, and the decision of the
County Board. Ms. Smith, Board Member, was recused.
The State Board heard oral
argument on July 7, 2009.
The State Board, at the conclusion of the oral argument on July 7, 2009, expressed a concern the County Board Record did not indicate when the 2008 assessment notices for the properties at issue were mailed, and when the notices of appeal to the County Board had been filed with the Assessor. There appeared, as a result, a question as to the jurisdictional authority of the County Board to consider Taxpayers’ appeals.
In response to the State Board’s expressed concern regarding the jurisdiction of the County Board, counsel for Taxpayers and the Assessor filed with the State Board a joint Motion to Supplement the Record on Jurisdictional Facts dated July 30, 2009. The Motion, supported by an affidavit by John G. Jenkins, indicated the Statements of Protest for all Taxpayers were hand-delivered to the Johnson County Clerk and the Johnson County Assessor on September 19, 2009. Mr. Jenkins’ affidavit, and attached envelope, established the assessment schedules for Lots 1-18, 22, 24, 26-40, 42-59, 61-80, 83-84, 87-99 of the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community were postmarked on August 21, 2008. This information established the Statements of Protest were timely filed, and the Johnson County Board of Equalization had jurisdiction to consider the appeals before it for the 2008 valuation of Lots 1-18, 22, 24, 26-40, 42-59, 61-80, 83-84, 87-99, Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community. [State Board Record].
There was, however, still a question, based on a lack of documentation in the County Board Record, notwithstanding this supplementation, as to whether the County Board had jurisdiction to consider appeals of the 2008 valuation for Lots 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 41, 60, 81, 82, 85-86, Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community. The State Board therefore issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss as to Lots Not Owned by Sand Creek Development Services, III, Inc., dated August 21, 2009. [State Board Record].
Taxpayers, on September 19, 2009, in response to the State Board’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed an Objection to Notice of Intent to Dismiss as to Lots Not Owned by Sand Creek Development Services, III, Inc., and a Supplement to Objection. The Objection and Supplement were supported by affidavits and exhibits sufficient to indicate the Statements of Protest for Lots 19, 20, 23, 41, 60, 82, 85 and 86, Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community, were timely filed and the Johnson County Board of Equalization had jurisdiction to consider the appeals before it for the 2008 valuation of those properties. There were, however, no affidavits or exhibits, or any other documentation supplied with the Objection and Supplement, which addressed the question of the County Board jurisdiction with regard to Lots 21, 25, and 81, Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community. The State Board has entered a separate order regarding Lots 21, 25, and 81.
We evaluate Taxpayers’ appeal of the County Board decision against our standard of review, which is whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and/or contrary to law. Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 3 § 9.
We reverse the decision of the County Board.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COUNTY BOARD
The County Board conducted a hearing on December 18, 2008, and entered its Order Upon Hearing on January 20, 2009, affirming the Assessor’s 2008 fair market value for Taxpayers’ property. [County Board Record, Volume 2, pp. 297-303, 310].
JURISDICTION
The State Board is required to “hear appeals from county boards of equalization.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c). Taxpayers filed a timely appeal of the County Board decision with the State Board effective January 30, 2009. Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 3 § 2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the State Board hears appeals from a County Board, it acts as an intermediate level of appellate review. Laramie County Board of Equalization v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 915 P.2d 1184, 1188 (Wyo. 1996); Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 859 (Wyo. 1990). In its appellate capacity, the State Board treats the County Board as the finder of fact. Id. In contrast, the State Board acts as the finder of fact when it hears contested cases on appeal from final decisions of the Department of Revenue (Department). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c). This sharp distinction in roles is reflected in the State Board Rules governing the two different types of proceedings. Compare Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 2 with Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 3. Statutory language first adopted in 1995, when the State Board and the Department were reorganized into separate entities, does not express the distinction between the State Board’s appellate and de novo capacities with the same clarity as our long-standing Rules. 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Chapter 209, § 1; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304(a), (currently Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c)).
By Rule, the State Board’s standards for review of a County Board decision are nearly identical to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act standards which a district court must apply to hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii). However, unlike a district court, the State Board will not rule on claims a County Board has acted “[c]ontrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-1-114(c)(ii)(B). The State Board’s review is limited to a determination of whether the County Board action is:
(a) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(b) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;
(c) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(d) Unsupported by substantial evidence.
Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 3 § 9.
Since the State Board Rules are patterned on the judicial review provision of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, we look to precedent under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) for guidance. For example, we must apply this substantial evidence standard:
When [a person] challenges a [county board]'s findings of fact and both parties submitted evidence at the contested case hearing, we examine the entire record to determine if the [county board]'s findings are supported by substantial evidence. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Wyoming Department of Revenue, 2001 WY 34, ¶ 8, 20 P.3d 528, 530 (Wyo.2001); RT Commc'ns, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11 P.3d 915, 920 (Wyo.2000). If the [county board]'s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the [county board] and will uphold the factual findings on appeal. “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence; it is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of the agency.” Id.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 2007 WY 79, ¶ 9, 158 P.3d 131, 134 (Wyo. 2007).
We review the findings of ultimate fact of a county board of equalization de novo:
“When an agency’s determinations contain elements of law and fact, we do not treat them with the deference we reserve for findings of basic fact. When reviewing an ‘ultimate fact,’ we separate the factual and legal aspects of the finding to determine whether the correct rule of law has been properly applied to the facts. We do not defer to the agency’s ultimate factual finding if there is an error in either stating or applying the law.” Basin Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, State of Wyo., 970 P.2d 841, 850-51 (Wyo. 1998)(citations omitted).
Britt v. Fremont County Assessor, 2006 WY 10, ¶ 17, 126 P.3d 117, 123 (Wyo. 2006).
We must also apply this “arbitrary and capricious” standard:
Even if sufficient evidence is found to support the agency’s decision under the substantial evidence test, this [Board] is also required to apply the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as a “safety net” to catch other agency action which might have violated the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act. Decker v. Wyoming Medical Comm’n, 2005 WY 160, ¶ 24, 124 P.3d 686, 694 (Wyo. 2005). “Under the umbrella of arbitrary and capricious actions would fall potential mistakes such as inconsistent or incomplete findings of fact or any violation of due process.” Id. (quoting Padilla v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Comp. Div., 2004 WY 10, ¶ 6, 84 P.3d 960, 962 (Wyo. 2004)).
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Comp. Div. v. Madeley, 2006 WY 63, ¶ 8, 134 P.3d 281, 284 (Wyo. 2006).
FACTS PRESENTED TO THE COUNTY BOARD
1. Taxpayers, in 2008, owned all ninety-nine (99) lots in the Sand Creek Conservation Community [Sand Creek] located in Johnson County, Wyoming. All lots in 2008 were valued by the Assessor as vacant land. [County Board Record, Vol. 1, pp. 44-142].
2. The Statements of Protest for all lots within Sand Creek were not dated. The notary certificate on each notice, however, indicated each Statement was signed on September 19, 2008. [County Board Record, Vol. 1, pp. 2-37; Exhibit 16, Vol. 3, pp. 557-601].
3. The County Board held a hearing on Taxpayers’ appeal on December 18, 2008. [County Board Record, Vol. 1, pp. 146-149; Vol. 5, pp. 675-930].
4. John Jenkins testified on behalf of Taxpayers. He and his wife, Carol, were the original owners of the Sand Creek Ranch, as well as the principal shareholders of Sand Creek Development Services, III. Mr. Jenkins and his wife also owned two of the lots under appeal. Mr. Jenkins was, therefore, both the developer and a lot owner. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 693-694].
5. John and Carol Jenkins transferred the Sand Creek Ranch to the Johnson County Ranch Improvement No. 1, LLC, by Limited Warranty Deed dated June 7, 2005. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 694-695; Exhibit 2, Vol. 3, pp. 330-334].
6. Johnson County Ranch Improvement No. 1, LLC, granted a conservation easement to the State of Wyoming by Deed of Conservation Easement dated April 18, 2007, as recorded with the Johnson County Clerk on June 6, 2007. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 695-696; Exhibit 3, Vol. 3, pp. 335-356].
7. Johnson County Ranch Improvement No. 1, LLC, recorded with the Johnson County Clerk, on May 16, 2007, the Sand Creek Community Declaration of Preservation Covenants (Covenants) dated the same date. The Covenants provided for the organization of the Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association, Inc., a Wyoming non-profit corporation. The purpose of the association was:
A. To own the Fee Association Property and manage and maintain the Common Lands for the benefit of the Members in accordance with this Declaration of Covenants.
B. To implement and enforce this Declaration of Preservation Covenants for the benefit of the Members.
C. To exercise the Association’s corporate power in accordance with and as limited by the Wyoming Nonprofit Corporation Act and the Articles of Incorporation for the benefit of the Members.
[County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 698-699; Exhibit 6, Vol. 3, pp. 363-399, 374; Exhibit 8, Vol. 3, pp. 402-410].
8. The Covenants, Article 1.19.5 defined a “ranch interest”:
The “Ranch Interests” are each comprised of one of the ninety-nine (99) individually-owned parcels of fee land depicted on the Plat, plus a one-ninety-ninth (1/99th) undivided interest in all Fee Association Property conveyed through membership in the Association. The Ranch Interest defines the totality of a Member’s ownership interest at SCRCC.
[County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 698-699; Exhibit 6, Vol. 3, p. 371].
9. Johnson County Ranch Improvement No. 1, LLC, by Warranty Deed dated September 7, 2007, as recorded with the Johnson County Clerk, conveyed and warranted to Sand Creek Development Services, III, Inc. all of the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community Planned Unit Development, Johnson County, Wyoming. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 696; Exhibit 4, Vol. 3, pp. 357-358].
10. Sand Creek Development Services, III, by Warranty Deed dated September 7, 2007, as recorded with the Johnson County Clerk on the same date, transferred to Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association, Inc. all of the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community Planned Unit Development, Johnson County, Wyoming, except Lots 1-99 of said Planned Unit Development. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 696-697; Exhibit 5, Vol. 3, pp. 359-362].
11. Mr. Jenkins asserted each purchaser of property subject to the Covenants acquired a “ranch interest” as defined by those Covenants, i.e., an undivided 1/99th interest in all of the Fee Association property, as well as a one-acre fee parcel. He analogized it to the situation wherein multiple individuals purchase a ranch, and each has a farmstead inside of the ranch. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 699-701, 711-713; Exhibit 6, Vol. 3, p. 371].
12. Mr. Jenkins pointed out two of the six specific purposes of the Covenants were to maintain the ranch as a working agricultural operation, and allow members to enjoy the pleasures inherent in owning a traditional western ranch and farm, including, as practical, participation on the working agricultural operation. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 700; Exhibit 6, Vol. 3, p. 372].
13. The Articles of Incorporation of the Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association, Inc., paragraph 6, provide the Association is a membership association without certificates or shares of stock. The owners of a Ranch Interest, as defined by the Covenants, are the members of the Association. Membership in the Association is appurtenant to the Ranch Interest, and can not be separated therefrom. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 701-702; Exhibit 8, Vol. 3, p. 405].
14. The Agreement for Deed between Sand Creek Development Services III, Inc. and Buyer listed all the documents associated with purchase of property in the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community. Mr. Jenkins asserted because each buyer received all of the noted documents, they understood they were getting a lot to build on, like any farmstead, as well as an interest in the Ranch. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 702-703; Exhibit 9, Vol. 3, p. 414].
15. The Agreement for Deed between Sand Creek Development Services III, Inc. and Buyer provided that upon closing of the sale of a lot [fee parcel] in the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community Planned Unit Development, the ownership of the fee parcel vests in the buyer all rights, duties, and obligations of a Member in the Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association, Inc. as described in the Declaration of Preservation Covenants. The Agreement further states a buyer’s ownership of a fee parcel and the incidents of ownership in the Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association, Inc. comprise the Ranch Interest described in the Declaration of Preservation Covenants. [County Board Record, Exhibit 9, Vol. 3, p. 415].
16. Mr. Jenkins testified the warranty deed received by each Taxpayer from Sand Creek Development Services III, Inc. contained the same language which, in addition to conveying a lot in the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community Planned Unit Development, also referenced, and made the conveyance subject to the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community Declaration of Preservation Covenants; the Articles of Incorporation of Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association, Inc.; the Master Plan of the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community Planned Unit Development; the Warranty Deed from Sand Creek Development Services III, Inc. to Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association, Inc.; and the Deed of Conservation Easement from Johnson County Ranch Improvement #1, LLC, to the State of Wyoming. Mr. Jenkins asserted the core right established by the Covenants was that each buyer owned the physically described one-acre homesite as well as a 1/99th interest in the ranch. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 703-705; Exhibits 10, 11, 12, Vol. 3, pp. 448-453].
17. Mr. Jenkins testified he met with the Assessor after the 2008 assessment notices had been issued. He made a presentation to help her have a full understanding of what a buyer purchased when they purchased property in Sand Creek. He asserted that 1/8 of what a buyer purchased was a one-acre lot with a designated building envelope inside, while 7/8 of the purchase was for a 1/99th interest in the entire ranch through shares in a corporation. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 705-708, 749-750; Exhibit 1, Vol. 3, pp. 326-329].
18. Mr. Jenkins stated that as of January 1, 2008, eleven lots in the Sand Creek Conservation Ranch Community had been sold. The purple boxes on Exhibit 1, p. 329, represented the 99 lots for sale. The darker green area on Exhibit 1, p. 329, approximately 350 acres, represented the area covered by center pivot irrigation sprinklers. The next lighter shade of green area on Exhibit 1, p. 329, approximately 500 acres, represented the Conservation easement. The lightest shade of green area on Exhibit 1, p. 329, approximately 400 acres, represented the remaining ranch area. Mr. Jenkins stated a three-quarter million dollar on-farm irrigation system was planned for the 400-acre area. He asserted that with a group of people owning the ranch, and operating it as a ranch, there were enough capital funds available to install approximately 50,000 linear feet of pipeline and six pivot irrigation sprinklers, which would allow the ranch to produce as much as 2000 tons of hay a year. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 708-711; Exhibit 1, Vol. 3, p. 329].
19. Mr. Jenkins asserted, based on his analysis in as early as 2006 on the market value of a conventional five-acre parcel in a subdivision adjacent to Sand Creek, the per-acre value of a Sand Creek fee lot was $21,000. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 714-716; Exhibit 7, Vol. 3, p. 401].
20. The Statements of Consideration (Statement) completed for the sales of Lots 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 41, 60, 81, 82, 85, of the Sand Creek Ranch Community Planned Unit Development indicated, at the top, the Statement had been “verified” with the Seller. Mr. Jenkins testified he was the seller of those lots, and he was never contacted by the Assessor’s office and asked to verify any of the Statements. No one ever asked why someone would pay $169,000 for a one-acre lot in Johnson County. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 716-718, 907; Exhibit 13, Vol. 3, pp. 454-464].
21. Mr. Jenkins stated for 2008, he and the other Taxpayers received assessment notices for their 99 one-acre lots, however, no assessment notice was received for the approximately 750 acres of the Sand Creek Ranch not included within the confines of the 99 lots. He thus contacted the Assessor’s office, and eventually received an assessment notice for that property as well. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 718-720].
22. Mr. Jenkins received, on September 15, 2008, two Notices of Assessment for 2008, each dated June 1st, incorrectly listing he and his wife as owners of the property which had been conveyed to the Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association some years earlier. The two assessment notices indicated a “Date of Assessment” of January 1, 2007, rather January 1, 2008, the assessment date for 2008. Mr. Jenkins did not appeal either of those assessments. The 2008 taxes on that property have been paid. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 720-722; Exhibit 14, Vol. 3, pp. 465-468].
23. Mr. Jenkins received 2008 Notices of Assessment for the two lots which he and his wife owned, as well as the 88 lots which had not been sold. Although each of the Notices indicated a “Date Mailed” of May 27, 2008, Mr. Jenkins stated the Notices were postmarked August 21, 2008. He opened them on Friday, August 22, 2008. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 723-724; Exhibit 15, Vol. 3, pp. 469-556].
24. Mr. Jenkins did not agree with the valuation of any of the one-acre lots. He arranged to meet with the Assessor on September 4, 2008. He asserted the Assessor, at the September 4th meeting, acknowledged she was not familiar with the warranty deeds transferring the lots, and had not found the Covenants nor any of the other documentation referenced in the warranty deeds. He noted it was also at this meeting he informed the Assessor there had been no assessment notice for the Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association land. Mr. Jenkins indicated the meeting provided no resolution of any issue. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 724-726].
25. There was a second meeting on November 6, 2008, during which Mr. Jenkins and his attorney met with the Assessor and her staff. Deputy County Attorney Barry Crago may have been involved by speaker phone. The Assessor, according to Mr. Jenkins, refused to allow any of the other lot owners in Sand Creek to attend the meeting. It was at this meeting, according to Mr. Jenkins, Mary Klaahsen, the deputy assessor, suggested there had been an error in the paperwork from the title company, and “this whole thing could be cleared up” with corrected Statements which took out the ranch ownership, the personal property corporate member interest. The transaction, according to Ms. Klaahsen, would at least then be more understandable on the face of the documents. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 726-729].
26. Mr. Jenkins went to the Assessor’s office on November 7, 2008, to get form Statements. He also requested copies of the original Statements, but was told they were not available. As suggested by Ms. Klaahsen, “Corrected” Statements for Lots 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 41, 60, 65, 70, 81, 82, 85, 86, were provided to the Assessor in November and December, 2008. Each Statement indicated under Part D - Terms of Sale, that the sale included property other than land or buildings, and provided an amount. None of the corrected Statements, however, gave the required “brief description” of what had been included in the sale other than land or buildings. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 728-730; Exhibit 17, Vol. 4, pp. 602-613].
27. Mr. Jenkins received, from the Assessor, a printout of the land value for parcels in the Emerald Park Subdivision, the Cloud Peak Ranchettes, the Johnson Creek Ranchettes, the Indian Valley Subdivision, and the Buena Vista Subdivision. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 730-734; Exhibits 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22, Vol. 4, pp. 614-633].
28. The acreage of the parcels in the Emerald Park Subdivision varied from 2.12 acres to
7.99 acres. Mr. Jenkins calculated a value per acre in the Emerald Park Subdivision of
$25,000.
[County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 730-734; Exhibit 18, Vol. 4, pp. 614-620].
29. Each of the Cloud Peak Ranchettes parcels contained just slightly over 5 acres. Mr. Jenkins calculated a value per acre in the Cloud Peak Ranchettes of $14,202. He stated these parcels were directly east across the road from Sand Creek. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 732-733; Exhibit 19, Vol. 4, pp. 621-627].
30. The parcels in the Johnson Creek Ranchettes were all 5 acres with two exceptions. One parcel was 4.74 acres while another was 5.26 acres. Mr. Jenkins calculated the average per acre value for the Johnson Creek Ranchettes at $14,103. He stated these parcels were just north of Sand Creek. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 733; Exhibit 20, Vol. 4, p. 628].
31. The parcels in the Indian Valley Subdivision were all approximately 2.5 acres. Mr. Jenkins calculated the per acre value for the Indian Valley Subdivision at $13,492. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 733; Exhibit 21, Vol. 4, pp. 629-631].
32. The acreage of the parcels in the Buena Vista Subdivision varied from 1.5 acres to 2.92 acres. Mr. Jenkins calculated an average value per acre in the Buena Vista Subdivision of $14,427. He stated this subdivision was located east of Interstate 25 on Rock Creek. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 733; Exhibit 22, Vol. 4, pp. 632-633].
33. Taxpayers received from the Assessor, in response to a discovery request, a listing of rural residential land by LEA [Land Economic Area] which indicated the average value per site, and the average acres. Mr. Jenkins calculated from this listing, after eliminating the 40-acre subdivisions, an average per acre value for rural residential land of $17,964. He stated in all his inquiries to the Assessor, he found nothing which would indicate one acre of rural land in Johnson County would be worth $169,000. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 734-736; Exhibit 24, Vol. 4, p. 662].
34. Mr. Jenkins stated his opinion the value of unsold real property inventory must be reduced because of the time horizon to sell all of the property. He asserted the value must be adjusted by a discount rate to reflect the time value of money associated with the unsold lots. He argued the value should be approximately 20 percent of the retail value. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 736-738].
35. Mr. Jenkins reiterated his assertion each purchaser of property in Sand Creek received a ranch interest which included a 1/99th share in the operating ranch, and as such, the owner of a ranch interest had basically the same rights and limitations in use of the ranch property as any family member of a well-managed family operation. The owner of a ranch interest received a right to share in control of a working ranch. The scope of activities on the working ranch was to be determined by the board of directors of the non-profit corporation, Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 744-748].
36. The original Statement which Mr. Jenkins signed for Lot 85, Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community, did not indicate the sale included property other than land or buildings. He asserted he signed the Statement as part the real estate closing, and did not pay adequate attention to it. He subsequently filed, as suggested by the Assessor’s office, corrected Statements. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 750-752, 755-756; Exhibit 13, Vol. 3, pp. 454-464; Exhibit 17, Vol. 4, pp. 602-613].
37. Mr. Jenkins asserted, based on information received from the Assessor, the average value of a farmstead in Johnson County in 2008 was $4030 per acre with a five acre minimum. He stated the Taxpayers were not seeking a value for their one-acre parcel of $4000. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 775-758].
38. Mr. Jenkins stated any profit generated by the ranch operation would go into reserves against depreciation of the buried pipeline system and above-ground sprinkler system. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 761-762].
39. Karen Buffington, the owner of the Re/Max real estate brokerage office in Buffalo, Wyoming, has been a realtor in Buffalo for twenty years. Her office handled mostly residential real estate, as well as commercial and land sales. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 765-766].
40. When someone expressed an interest in Sand Creek, Ms. Buffington would tell them they would not be buying just a lot. They would be buying a ranch interest composed of two parts. One component was a one-acre homesite on the ranch. The other component was an interest in the ranch as a whole through the ranch preservation association, Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association. She used a “Value Calculator” to indicate to potential buyers the value of the one-acre lot was $21,000, and the balance of whatever they paid was attributable to their interest in the Association. She stated she had not seen a sale closed in Johnson County which represented a value of $168,000 per acre on residential land. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 767-770; Exhibit 7, Vol. 3 p. 400].
41. Ms. Buffington stated, based on actual sales she had reviewed in the last year, the price of vacant rural residential land had varied from a low of $17,159 per acre to a high of $26,133 per acre. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 771-772].
42. Ms. Buffington signed a number of the original Statements for the fee lots in Sand Creek as agent. None of those Statements indicated anything other than land or buildings had been sold. She stated any variable in the sale price would be attributable to the unique characteristics of a particular one-acre lot. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 773-775; Exhibit 13, Vol. 3, pp. 454-464].
43. Ms. Buffington stated her opinion that 7/8ths of the real estate purchase price of a fee lot in Sand Creek should be attributable to the acquisition of an interest in the common area, the working ranch. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 777-778].
44. Olin Turner owned a ranch interest in Sand Creek. He stated his belief what he purchased was a one-acre parcel with an interest in a production ranch. He did not think he was paying $168,000 for a one-acre parcel, and would not have paid that amount for one-acre. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 780-783].
45. Marc Strahn owned a ranch interest in Sand Creek. He also stated his belief that when he purchased a ranch interest, he purchased a building site as well as an interest in the working ranch. He asserted he had bought into the ownership of the ranch. He stated he analyzed what he would pay for a ranch the size of Sand Creek, and from that amount determined what he would pay for a 1/99th interest in such a ranch. He valued the one-acre parcel based on this calculation and the selling price for other lots in the area. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 786-790, 794-796, 798].
46. Deborah Nagel Smith testified on behalf of Taxpayers. She was the Albany County Assessor for 24 years, until retiring in 2007. She was certified as an appraiser by the Department from enactment of the certification requirement until she retired. She also served as president of the Wyoming County Assessors Association, as well as president of the Wyoming Association of County Officers. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 799-802].
47. Ms. Smith, as the assessor for Albany County, Wyoming, was experienced in appraising a variety of property, including residential, industrial, agricultural, and personal. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 802-803].
48. Ms. Smith was experienced in use of computer assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) systems in property appraisal. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 803-805].
49. Ms. Smith made an on-site visit to the Sand Creek property. She also reviewed the Covenants, Warranty Deeds and Conservation Easement associated with the property. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 805-806, 814].
50. It was the practice in Albany County, according to Ms. Smith, to verify the sales information contained on the Statement by telephoning the buyer or seller, or by mailing a questionnaire to the buyer. It was important to verify sales information, according to Ms. Smith, in order to input correct data into the CAMA system. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 809-810].
51. Ms. Smith stated it was her practice as the Albany County Assessor to meet with buyers or owners to correct, if necessary, the sales information on a Statement. She would then have the buyers or owners correct and resubmit the Statement. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 810-811].
52. Ms. Smith testified she reviewed all property documents provided by the Johnson County Assessor’s office, and physically viewed the neighborhood properties around Sand Creek. She determined the lots acquired by Taxpayers in Sand Creek should be valued in a range, based on vacant rural residential land, of $15,000 to $26,000 or $28,000, depending on location. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 814-817].
53. Ms. Smith opined, based upon her experience and review of the property information, the value of each of the Sand Creek lots would be in the range of $20,000 to $25,000. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 818].
54. Ms. Smith testified to her opinion the purchasers of Sand Creek properties were buying two separate interests in Sand Creek, one of which was an interest in the corporation. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 807].
55. Ms. Smith asserted the corporate share interest acquired with a purchase of a Sand Creek lot should not be taxed. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 808, 811, 818].
56. Ms. Smith agreed the intangible characteristics of a piece of real property contribute to its value. She asserted the properties neighboring Sand Creek had intangible characteristics similar to Sand Creek. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 821, 823, 831].
57. Ms. Smith considered intangible characteristics, such as view and open space, as well as the absences of other undesirable structures, such as “skyscrapers or saw mill,” when arriving at a value for the Sand Creek lots. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 824, 831].
58. Ms. Smith believed the purchase of a lot in Sand Creek included the purchase of 1/99th interest in the ranch, which was a non-taxable membership interest. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 832].
59. Ms. Smith was not aware of any form required by the Department to request an exemption for an intangible interest in real property. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 834].
60. Dorothy Elsom has worked in the Johnson County Assessor’s office since October 1, 1960. She has been the elected Johnson County Assessor since September 1978. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 842].
61. Ms. Elsom was currently certified by the Department as an appraiser having completed the required annual education. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 842].
62. Ms. Elsom described Sand Creek as a subdivision that “is a very different situation.” She stated the real property cannot be treated as agricultural land because it was a platted subdivision. She said “the 1-acre tracts have to be assessed as rural residential land.” [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 845].
63. Ms. Elsom stated Sand Creek was “such a unique area” it was placed its own LEA. She could not combine it with another LEA, as there were “no other comparables.” [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 846-847, 860, 863].
64. Ms. Elsom stated of the eleven 2007 sales in Sand Creek, two were disqualified. The value of the nine other sales totaled $1,517,752. The average of the sales was $168,639. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 846; Exhibit 13, Vol. 3, pp. 454-464].
65. According to Ms. Elsom, her only choice in valuing the Sand Creek lots was to use the average sales method. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 847-848].
66. Although Ms. Elsom understood the price paid by each purchaser of property in Sand Creek included a one-acre lot as well as a membership interest in the corporation, she did not agree the membership was personal property. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 851-852].
67. Ms. Elsom was not certain how each sale of a Sand Creek lot was verified. She did not personally do any verifications of the sales. She based her valuations on the sales amount listed on each original Statement of Consideration form. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 853-854].
68. Mary Klaahsen, the deputy county assessor, has worked in the Assessor’s office for seventeen years. She was currently certified by the Department as an appraiser. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 855].
69. Ms. Klaahsen believed each sale of a lot of Sand Creek property included a willing seller and a willing buyer and was an “arm’s length” transaction. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 856-859].
70. Ms. Klaahsen testified she verified the sales of lots in Sand Creek by relying solely upon prior knowledge the lots were on the market, and the information provided in the Statements. She didn’t believe there was any reason to verify beyond the data contained in the Statement, and made no phone calls nor mailed any verification forms to the owners or sellers in Sand Creek. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 856-859; 866-867].
71. Ms. Klaahsen believed each owner of a Sand Creek lot had to apply to the Assessor for an exemption for any kind of “intangible” property. She stated no such claims had been filed. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 864-865].
72. Ms. Klaahsen believed the “intangible characteristics” associated with Sand Creek increased the value of each lot approximately $140,000. She indicated she had never experienced such an increase in Johnson County prior to appraising Sand Creek. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 864-866, 871-872].
73. Jack Rehm testified on behalf of the Assessor. He was a principal appraiser with the Department, with eleven years in that position, plus an additional three years with the Natrona County Assessor’s office. Mr. Rehm admitted, however, he was not an assessing officer, and did not assess any property for the state. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 873-874; 894].
74. Mr. Rehm stated his job was to assure the Assessor had correctly valued Sand Creek, not to defend the value. He reviewed the procedures used by the Assessor in verifying the Sand Creek sales and entry of sales data. He found the assessor had done a good job, with “no malfeasance.” [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 875, 886-887].
75. Mr. Rehm did not examine the warranty deeds for any of lots sold in Sand Creek during his review. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 888].
76. Mr. Rehm did not review the Declaration of Preservation Covenants, as they relate to Sand Creek, as he “felt that wasn’t relevant.” [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 888].
77. Mr. Rehm he did not read the Articles of Incorporation relating to Sand Creek. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 889].
78. Mr. Rehm did not review the Conservation Easement relating to Sand Creek. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, p. 888].
79. Mr. Rehm stated the Department Rules required Taxpayers make a written request for exemption from ad valorem taxation for intangibles associated with ownership in Sand Creek. He stated in his review of the Assessor’s files, he did not find any exemption requests. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 877-878, 890-894].
80. Mr. Rehm asserted it was correct for the Assessor to put Sand Creek into its own LEA. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 878-879].
81. Sand Creek was different from other LEA’s in Johnson County, in Mr. Rehm’s opinion, due to lot size, restrictions, and the common area. Mr. Rehm compared Sand Creek to other Johnson County LEA’s, such as Cloud Peak, Wagon Wheel, Emerald Acres, and Johnson Creek. He examined sales data of the LEA’s and determined those properties, when compared to Sand Creek, were not valid for use as comparable sales. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 879-882].
82. Mr. Rehm stated Sand Creek had to be assessed at “full market value,” which included all intangibles, because Taxpayers did not apply to the Assessor for the proper exemptions. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 879-884].
83. Mr. Rehm agreed an individual does not have to apply for an exemption for an intangible such as a share of stock or an interest in the Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 890-893].
84. Mr. Rehm did not review how the Assessor valued “farmsteads”as he did not believe it was relevant to Sand Creek. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 894-895].
85. Mr. Rehm reviewed the amended Statements pertaining to Sand Creek, but did not know whether they were used by the Assessor in her assessment of Sand Creek lots. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 895-896].
86. Mr. Rehm believed the actions of the Assessor, as well as her assessment of the Sand Creek lots, were valid and legal. [County Board Record, Vol. 5, pp. 885, 897].
87. The County Board issued its decision on January 20, 2009, affirming the Assessor’s 2008 fair market value for Taxpayers’ property. [County Board Record, Vol. 2, pp. 297-304; 310].
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES AND APPLICABLE LAW
General Legal Principles
88. The Wyoming Constitution, article 15, § 11(b), provides in pertinent part: “[a]ll taxable property shall be valued at its full value as defined by the legislature except agricultural and grazing lands which shall be valued according to the capability of the land to produce agricultural products under normal conditions.”
89. The Wyoming Constitution, article 15 § 11(d), requires “[a]ll taxation shall be equal and uniform within each class of property. The legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal.”
90. Broken into its component parts, the constitutional standard requires: (1) a rational method; (2) equally applied to all property; and (3) essential fairness. It is the burden of one challenging an assessment to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of these elements has not been fulfilled. Basin Electric Power Coop. v. Dept. of Revenue, 970 P.2d 841, 852 (Wyo. 1998).
91. The Legislature has required all property in Wyoming to be valued annually at fair market value. Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 39-13-103(b)(ii). The statutory valuation date is January 1 of each year; all taxable property must be valued and assessed for taxation in the name of the owner of the property on that date. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-103(b)(i).
92. Fair market value is defined as:
[T]he amount in cash, or terms reasonable equivalent to cash, a well informed buyer is justified in paying for a property and a well informed seller is justified in accepting, assuming neither party to the transaction is acting under undue compulsion, and assuming the property has been offered in the open market for a reasonable time.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-101(a)(vi).
93. Each county assessor annually determines the fair market value of residential real property within their county. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 18-3-204(a)(i), (ii), (vi); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-13-103(b)(i). In so doing, the assessor must “[f]aithfully and diligently follow and apply the orders, procedures and formulae of the department of revenue or orders of the state board of equalization for the appraisal and assessment of all taxable property.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-204(a)(ix).
94. The Department has a corresponding statutory obligation to confer with, advise and give necessary instructions and directions to the county assessors as to their duties, and to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the enforcement of all tax measures. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102(c)(xvi), (xix). The Department is required to “[p]rescribe the system of establishing the fair market value of all property valued for property taxation to ensure that all property within a class is uniformly valued.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102(c)(xv). In particular, the Department must “prescribe by rule and regulation the appraisal methods and systems for determining fair market value using generally accepted appraisal standards.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-103(b)(ii).
95. The Department has promulgated rules which establish appraisal techniques which
may be used by an assessor. Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 9 § 5
. These
techniques include the Sales Comparison Approach, the Cost Approach, and the Income or
Capitalized Earnings Approach. Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 9 §
5(a.)(i.)(ii.)(iii.). Administrative rules have the force and effect of law. Wyo. Dep’t of
Revenue v Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2003 WY 54, ¶ 18, 67 P.3d 1176, 1184 (Wyo. 2003);
Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939 (Wyo. 2000).
96. The Department’s Rules provide for use of a CAMA system. Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 9 § 7. CAMA “automates the comparable sales and replacement cost methods.” Britt v. Fremont County Assessor, 2006 WY 10, ¶ 39, 126 P.3d 117, 128 (Wyo. 2006).
97. The Department also prescribes how the various valuation methods are to be evaluated and utilized by an assessor:
Section 5. Appraisal Methods.
(a.) The appraisal techniques which may be used by the County Assessor include the approaches described in this section. Each approach used shall be an appropriate method or the type of property being valued; that is, the property shall fit the assumptions inherent in the appraisal method in order to calculate or estimate the fair market value of the property. Each approach used shall also consider the nature of the property and the regulatory and economic environment within which the property operates. All methods used by the Assessor shall be consistent with the applicable IAAO and USPAP standards including, but not limited to, the following (except where standards conflict with Wyoming Statute or Rule): IAAO Standard on Mass Appraisal (2008), IAAO Standard on Automated Valuation Models (AVMs) (2003), IAAO Standard on Ratio Studies (part A) (2007), Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) Standard 6 (2008-2009), IAAO Standard on Property Tax Policy and IAAO Standard on Valuation of Personal Property (2004).
Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 9 § 5(a.).
Section 9. Reconciliation.
(a.) The appraiser shall weigh the relative significance, applicability and appropriateness of the indications of value derived from the approaches to value or methods outlined above, and will place the most weight and reliance on the value indicator which, in his professional judgment, best approximates the value of the subject property. The appraiser shall evaluate all alternative conclusions and reconcile the value indicators to arrive at a final estimate of value. For market value, the final estimate is that value which most nearly represents what the typical, informed, rational purchaser would pay for the subject property and a rational seller would accept if it were available for sale on the open market as of the date of the appraisal, given all the data utilized by appraisers in their analyses.
Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 9 § 9.
98. The Wyoming Constitution enumerates what property is exempt from taxation:
The property of the United States, the state, counties, cities, towns, school districts and municipal corporations, when used primarily for a governmental purpose, and public libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for religious worship, church parsonages, church schools and public cemeteries, shall be exempt from taxation, and such other property as the legislature may by general law provide.
Wyoming Constitution, article 15 § 12.
99. The Wyoming statutes on taxation and revenue provide:
"Intangible personal property" means personal property that lacks mass and cannot be seen, felt, weighed, measured or otherwise perceived by the senses; property that has no physical existence beyond merely representational. Intangible property's value lies chiefly in what it represents, and its existence may be evidenced by a document;
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-101(a)(vii).
100. The Wyoming statutes on taxation and revenue exempt intangible personal property from taxation:
The following property is exempt from property taxation:
* * *
Intangible personal property as provided by subsection (b) of this section, and
except as specified in W.S. 39-13-103(b)(xi)
;
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-105(a)(xxix).
(b) The following shall be exempt from property taxation:
(i) Goodwill if established and separately identified on a company's books and records, or affirmed by generally accepted accounting, or appraisal, principles;
(ii) Any of the following intangible items:
(A) Workforce in place including its composition and terms and condition, contractual or otherwise, of its employment;
(B) Business books and records, operating systems or any other information base including lists or other information with respect to current or prospective customers;
(C) Any patent, copyright, formula, process, design, pattern, know-how, format, proprietary computer software or other similar items;
(D) Any customer-based intangible. As used in this subparagraph, "customer-based intangible" means composition of market, market share and any other value resulting from future provision of goods or services pursuant to relationships, contractual or otherwise, in the ordinary course of business with customers. In the case of a financial institution, "customer-based intangible" includes deposit base and similar items;
(E) Any supplier-based intangible. As used in this subparagraph, "supplier-based intangible" means any value resulting from future acquisitions of goods or services pursuant to relationships, contractual or otherwise, in the ordinary course of business with suppliers of goods or services to be used or sold by the taxpayer.
(iii) Any license, permit or other right granted by a person, or by a governmental unit or an agency or instrumentality thereof;
(iv) Any covenant not to compete, or other arrangement to the extent such arrangement has substantially the same effect as a covenant not to compete, entered into in connection with an acquisition directly or indirectly of an interest in a trade or business or substantial portion thereof;
(v) Any franchise, trademark or trade name;
(vi) Any of the following intangible items:
(A) Money and cash on hand including currency, gold, silver and other coin, bank drafts, certified checks and cashier's checks;
(B) Money on deposit;
(C) Accounts receivable and other credits;
(D) Bonds, promissory notes, debentures and other evidences of debt;
(E) Shares of stock or other written evidence of ownership;
(F) Judgments for the payment of money;
(G) Annuities and annuity contracts.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-105(b).
101. The Department Rules on property tax exemptions, which became effective as
indicated by the Wyoming Secretary of State
on May 21, 2008, state regarding intangibles:
(b.) Definitions: As used in this subsection the following terms from W.S. 39-11-101 apply:
(i) “Intangible personal property” means personal property that lacks mass and cannot be seen, felt, weighed, measured or otherwise perceived by the senses; property that has no physical existence beyond merely representational. Intangible property’s value lies chiefly in what it represents and its existence may be evidenced by a document.
(ii) “Tangible personal property” means personal property that, by its nature, is perceptible to the senses; property that has a physical presence beyond merely representational and that is capable of being touched; property that is able to be perceived as materially existent; property that is not intangible.
Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 14 § 10(b.).
(g.) Any of the following intangible items:
* * *
(E.) Shares of stock or other written evidence of ownership;
Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 14 § 10(g.)(E.).
(h.) Criteria for reporting of Intangible Exemptions.
(i.) Requests for exemption shall be timely filed with the exemption clearly defined and supplemented by all supporting documentation as defined within these rules, on forms provided by the appropriate assessing jurisdiction. Taxpayer(s) shall not self exempt property or property considerations from their report forms. If such a condition is found, the exemption shall be denied in its entirety to the requesting taxpayer(s).
(ii.) The intangible must be capable of being separately identified on the taxpayer’s company:
(A.) Books and records;
(B.) Reports filed with any municipal, county, state or federal agency;
(C.) Federal income tax returns; or
(D.) Other documentation as required by the assessing jurisdiction.
Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 14 §§ 10(h.)(i.), 10(h.)(ii.).
(j.) Documents in support of requested intangibles shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(i.) A third party fair market value appraisal for the requested exempt intangible assets;
(ii.) Copies of audited company books and records, jurisdictional regulatory reports, current federal income tax returns specifically identifying the values or assets being claimed;
(iii.) Independent narrative appraisals and/or valuation engineering studies defining all requested intangible assets by: vintage year by property or property consideration, actual use, economic life’s, depreciation trends, net book values and appraised fair market value can meet the definition of as noted in the beginning of this statement.
(iv.) For newly merged or acquired property or property considerations, documentation for requested intangible items must be separately listed and identified within corporate records of minutes.
Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 14 § 10(j.).
(m.) The assessing jurisdiction shall as part of the final fair market value appraisal provide to the taxpayer the following detail:
(i.) Itemized listing for all requested intangibles;
(ii.) Statement of whether the exemption was granted or denied;
(iii.) Explanation for all denied exemption items;
(iv.) Calculations on determination for all granted exemption amounts;
(v.) Appraisal methods utilized to determine exemption amounts;
(vi.) Appeal rights, if separate from the final fair market value of the property.
Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 14 § 10(m.).
102. The Wyoming statutes contain the following definition:
"Real property" means land and appurtenances, including structures, affixed thereto, and any intangible characteristic which contributes to the fair market value thereof;
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-101(a)(xv).
The Presumption in Favor of an Assessor’s Value
103. The determination of fair market value inevitably involves a degree of discretion:
Early on, Justice Blume recognized a truth inherent in the area of property valuation: “There is no such thing as absolute value. A stone cannot be other than a stone, but one man may give a different valuation to a piece of land than another.” Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass’n, 29 Wyo. 461, 475, 215 P. 244, 248 (l923). Accordingly, this court has consistently interpreted Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 11 to require “only a rational method [of appraisal], equally applied to all property which results in essential fairness.”
Basin Electric Power Coop. v. Dept. of Revenue, 970 P.2d 841, 857 (Wyo.1998) quoting Holly Sugar Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 839 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo.1992). The Wyoming Supreme Court has recently reiterated the “rational method” standard. Britt v. Fremont County Assessor, 2006 WY 10, ¶ 18, 126 P.3d 117, 123 (Wyo. 2006).
104. An assessor’s valuation is presumed valid, accurate, and correct. This presumption survives until overturned by credible evidence. Britt v. Fremont County Assessor, 2006 WY 10, ¶ 23, 126 P.3d 117, 125 (Wyo. 2006); Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Campbell County, Wyoming Assessor, 2006 WY 44, ¶ 13, 132 P.3d 801, 806 (Wyo. 2006); Teton Valley Ranch v. State Board of Equalization, 735 P.2d 107, 113 (Wyo. 1987). A mere difference of opinion as to value is not sufficient to overcome the presumption. J Ray McDermott & Co. v. Hudson, 370 P.2d 364, 370 (Wyo. 1962); Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Campbell County, Wyoming Assessor, 2006 WY 44, ¶¶ 13, 48, 132 P.3d 801, 806, 816 (Wyo. 2006). The presumption is especially valid where the Assessor valued the property according to the Department’s Rules and Regulations which provide for the use of the CAMA system in the assessment of real property. Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 9 § 7. “The burden is on the taxpayer to establish any overevaluation.” Hillard v. Big Horn Coal Co., 549 P.2d 293, 294 (Wyo. 1976).
105. The Wyoming Supreme Court has described the burden of proof for a taxpayer challenging a county assessor’s valuation:
A strong presumption favors the Assessor’s valuation. “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the officials charged with establishing value exercised honest judgment in accordance with the applicable rules, regulations, and other directives that have passed public scrutiny, either through legislative enactment or agency rule-making, or both.” Amoco Production Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 2004 WY 89, ¶ 7, 94 P.3d 430, 435 (Wyo. 2004). The Britts [i.e., the protesting taxpayers] had the initial burden of presenting evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. Id., ¶ 8. If the Britts successfully overcame the presumption, then the county board was “required to equally weigh the evidence of all parties and measure it against the appropriate burden of proof.” CIG v. Wyoming Dept. of Revenue, 2001 WY 34, ¶ 10, 20 P.3d 528, 531 (Wyo. 2001). The burden of going forward would then have shifted to the Assessor to defend her valuation. Id. Above all, the Britts bore “the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the valuation was not derived in accordance with the required constitutional and statutory requirements for valuing . . . property.” Id.
Britt, supra, 2006 WY 10, ¶ 23, 126 P.3d at 125.
106. The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized the validity of valuations derived from the CAMA system. Gray v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 896 P.2d 1347 (Wyo. 1995), Britt v. Fremont County Assessor, 2006 WY 10, ¶ 17, 126 P.3d 117, 123 (Wyo. 2006). In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the use of actual sales price for properties in favor of the value established by the CAMA system because of the equality and uniformity which result from its use. Gray, supra, at 1351.
107. Our evaluation of this appeal turns, at least in part, on the question of whether there is substantial evidence in the record which reasonably supports the County Board’s decisions. In determining whether the required substantial evidence is present, the State Board will not substitute its judgement for findings reasonably supported by evidence in the County Board record. Laramie County Board of Equalization v. State Board of Equalization, 915 P.2d 1184, 1188-1189 (Wyo. 1996); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 839 P.2d 959 (Wyo. 1992); Sage Club, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm’n., 601 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Wyo. 1979). While substantial evidence may be less than the weight of the evidence, it cannot be clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated “[s]ubstantial evidence is a term of art best described as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind can accept as adequate support for an agency’s conclusion.” Sidwell v. State Workers’ Compensation Div., 977 P.2d 60, 63 (Wyo. 1999).
Discussion
108. As the Wyoming Supreme Court pointed out in Britt, supra, a protesting taxpayer has the initial burden of presenting sufficient credible evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of the valuation established by the assessor. If a taxpayer meets this initial burden, the burden of going forward shifts to the assessor to defend their valuation. The ultimate burden of proof - burden of persuasion - is, however, always borne by the protesting taxpayer. We therefore consider Taxpayers’ appeal in light of this authority. Supra, ¶¶ 104, 105.
109. The Assessor valued each Sand Creek fee lot for 2008 at $168,639, that figure being the average of nine parcel sales in 2007 in Sand Creek which the Assessor considered valid for purposes of valuation. Supra, ¶¶ 64, 65; [Exhibit 13, Vol. 3, pp. 454-464; Exhibit 15, Vol. 3, pp. 469-556].
110. The Assessor agreed the price paid by each purchaser of property in Sand Creek included both a fee lot, as well as a membership interest in a non-profit corporation. She did not, however, agree the corporate membership interest was separate personal property. The Deputy Assessor asserted the “intangible characteristics” associated with the fee lots in Sand Creek increased the value of each parcel by $140,000, an increase the magnitude of which she had never before experienced in her 17 years in the Assessor’s office. Supra, ¶¶ 66, 68, 72.
111. The evidence presented by Taxpayers at the County Board hearing, as reflected by the County Board Record, was not significantly, if at all, challenged by the Assessor. Such evidence was well articulated and clearly credible. It supports Taxpayers’ assertion the price paid by each purchaser for property in Sand Creek included not only a fee lot, but also a membership interest in a non-profit corporation, the Sand Creek Ranch Preservation Association, Inc. (Association). The warranty deed received by a purchaser of property in Sand Creek distinctly references the Sand Creek Community Declaration of Covenants (Covenants) as recorded with the Johnson County Clerk, and the Articles of Incorporation of the Association filed with the Wyoming Secretary of State. The Covenants define what a purchaser of property in Sand Creek acquired as a “ranch interest” which included not only the fee lot, but an Association membership as well. The Association is a membership organization without certificates or shares of stock which owns all the Sand Creek property other than the 99 fee lots. An Association membership is an integral part of, and can not be transferred separately from, a ranch interest. Supra, ¶¶ 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14 15, 16.
112. A membership interest in a non-profit corporation, such as the Association, even if not memorialized by a share of stock or certificate of membership, but rather, as in this matter, otherwise identified in appropriate documentation including the Covenants and Association Articles of Incorporation, is nonetheless intangible personal property, and as such, is exempt from taxation. Supra, ¶¶ 99, 100, 101; RT Communications, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 11 P.3d 915, 925 (Wyo. 2000).
113. The attribution of the value of a membership interest in the Association in determining the fair market value of a fee lot in Sand Creek was inappropriate. The credible evidence presented by Taxpayers, in conjunction with the applicable law, points to a conclusion the fee lot, for purposes of assessment and taxation, must be valued taking into consideration that a portion of the price paid by each purchaser was attributable to the tax exempt intangible personal property acquired with the parcel, i.e., the membership interest in the Association. Appleby v. Nolte, 682 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1996) [country club membership represented an “intangible personal property,” exempt from ad valorem taxation, and such membership, thus, could not be included in assessed value of taxpayer’s home, even though a home sold with an agreement to transfer a membership would generally command higher price.]
114. There is, based on the language of the warranty deeds transferring the fee lots in Sand Creek and the Covenants, another possible characterization which warrants discussion of what a purchaser of property in Sand Creek acquired in addition to a fee lot.
115. The warranty deed for a fee lot in Sand Creek made conveyance of the lot “subject to” the Covenants. Supra, ¶¶ 14, 15, 16; [Exhibits 10, 11, 12, Vol. 3, pp. 448-453]. Those Covenants were established by the Johnson County Ranch Improvement#1, LLC, before it conveyed any property to the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community Planned Unit Development, i.e, while it still owned all of the Sand Creek property. The Covenants provide they “shall run with the land and shall be a burden and benefit to the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community, Declarant and Declarant’s successors, the Association, the Members and their successors, and all parties having any right, title or interest in the land or any part thereof, their heirs, successors, and assigns….” Supra, ¶¶ 7, 8, 9; [Exhibit 6, Vol. 3, pp. 363-399; Exhibit 8, Vol. 3, pp. 402-410].
116. The Covenants also stated a “ranch interest” included any one of the “individually-owned parcels of fee land depicted on the Plat, plus a one-ninety-ninth (1/99th) undivided interest in all Fee Association Property conveyed through membership in the Association.” (Emphasis added). Supra, ¶ 8; [Exhibit 6, Vol. 3, p. 371].
117. One might argue, based on the referenced scenario, a purchaser of property in Sand Creek acquired not only fee ownership of a lot, but also a 1/99th fee ownership interest in all property owned by the Association. If this were in fact true, a portion of the price paid by each purchaser in Sand Creek would then be attributable to a fee interest in Association property, the value of which was (or should have been) separately assessed to the Association. Attribution of the full purchase price of a “ranch interest” to determine the value of only a fee lot would, therefore, in effect, improperly assess and tax to both the Association and the fee lot owner the value of a 1/99th interest in the Association property.
118. The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that in order to properly convey an interest in real property, an expression in the conveyance of intent to convey as well as a property description of what is being conveyed are elementary and essential.
It is elementary that to effect the transfer or conveyance of an interest in real estate that a description is essential and the subject matter identified.[FN1] Any conveyance of an interest in real property must clearly indicate intention to convey specific property and describe it. FN1. 6 Thompson on Real Property, s 3020, p. 437 (1962 Repl.); 26 C.J.S. Deeds s 29, p. 639.
King v. White, 499 P.2d 585, 588 (Wyo. 1972).
119. The use of another document as extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence beyond the four corners of the conveyance document, when attempting to determine what the conveyance is intended to convey, is only allowed to identify the property referenced on the conveyance, not expand what is being conveyed.
To be sufficient, a writing conveying title must provide within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing in existence at the time of the deed, the means or information by which the land being conveyed can be identified with reasonable certainty. Williams v. Ellison, 493 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.1973) (citations omitted). This has been termed the “nucleus of description” theory. Id. Under this theory, if the deed contains a “nucleus of description,” parol evidence may be introduced to explain the descriptive words in order to locate the land. Gates v. Asher, 154 Tex. 538, 541, 280 S.W.2d 247, 248 (1955) (citations omitted). “If enough appears in the description so that a party familiar with the locality can identify the premises with reasonable certainty, it will be sufficient.” Id.
Extrinsic evidence may be used “only for the purpose of identifying the [property] with reasonable certainty from the data” contained in the contract, “not for the purpose of supplying the location or description of the [property].” Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.1983).
Gaut v. Daniel, 293 S.W. 3d 764, 767 ( Tex. 2009). See also, Dickson v. Kates, 133 P.3d 498, 503 (Wash. 2006); Texaco, Inc. v. H.O. Roy, Inc., 229 So.2d 739, 740 (La. 1969).
120. The warranty deeds conveying the fee lots in Sand Creek clearly described what was being conveyed, i.e., a fee lot, therefore reference to another document as extrinsic evidence, such as the Covenants, is neither necessary nor permitted. The warranty deeds, even though containing a reference to the Covenants, were effective to transfer only the fee lots clearly indicated in the deeds. The deeds were not effective to convey a 1/99th fee interest in the Association property.
121. Taxpayers presented to the County Board, as reflected by the County Board Record, sufficient admissible credible evidence to support a conclusion the purchase of a fee lot in Sand Creek also included acquisition of an exempt intangible property interest. The evidence presented by Taxpayers was sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the Assessor’s valuation of the fee lots. The Assessor was thus required to defend the 2008 value she placed on the fee lots in Sand Creek. Supra, ¶¶ 104, 105.
122. The 2008 value placed by the Assessor on all 99 fee lots in Sand Creek was based solely on an average of the prices paid for nine of those lots in 2007, as reflected by the original Statements. Neither the Assessor, nor anyone in her office, verified any of the information indicated on those Statements by contacting either Mr. Jenkins or any of the other buyers. Such a verification process would surely have alerted the Assessor to the fact the purchase price indicated was intended to acquire more than the fee lot itself. Supra, ¶¶ 25, 26, 67, 70.
123. The Assessor, in discussions with Mr. Jenkins after the 2008 assessment schedules had been issued, refused to modify the 2008 fee lot values. She continued to rely on the original Statements even though she, through her deputy, Ms. Klaahsen, suggested “corrected” Statements which took out the personal property corporate interest should be provided, and “this whole thing could be cleared up.” Such Statements indicating something more than the purchase of a fee lot was included in the purchase price were provided to the Assessor. Supra, ¶¶ 25, 26.
124. Ms. Klaahsen asserted the “intangible characteristics” associated with Sand Creek increased the value of each fee lot by approximately $140,000, an increase she acknowledged she had never previously experienced in Johnson County. Supra, ¶ 72.
125. The testimony by Ms. Klaahsen was arguably a reference to the Wyoming statutory definition of real property which includes “any intangible characteristic which contributes to fair market value” as an element of the real property. Supra, ¶ 102. Neither Ms. Klaahsen nor any other witness or evidence presented on behalf of the Assessor addressed, however, what “intangible characteristic” of the Sand Creek fee lots would create a $140,000 increase in value. Such evidence or testimony was crucial to the defense of the Assessor’s value in light of the evidence presented by Taxpayers, based almost solely on information from the Assessor’s office, that the highest per acre value of lots across the road and in the vicinity of Sand Creek was approximately $24,000. Supra, ¶¶ 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33.
126. Jack Rehm, from the Department, was the only other person presenting testimony on behalf of the Assessor. Mr. Rehm conceded he was not an assessing officer; he did not assess property for the state; and he had not examined the Sand Creek warranty deeds, the Declaration of Covenants, the Articles of Incorporation of the Association, nor the Conservation Easement. He simply asserted, with regard to the 2008 Sand Creek fee lot values, the Assessor had done a good job with “no malfeasance.” His testimony did not significantly bolster the Assessor’s defense of the 2008 values she assigned to the Sand Creek fee lots. Supra, ¶¶ 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78.
127. The evidence presented on behalf of the Assessor was not sufficient to defend her 2008 values for the fee lots in Sand Creek. The evidence presented by Taxpayers to the County Board was clearly sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the Assessor’s 2008 values for the Sand Creek fee lots improperly failed to account for the fact the price paid by purchasers of property in Sand Creek included, in addition to the fee lot, acquisition of an exempt intangible personal property interest in the form of a membership in the Association. Supra, ¶¶ 104, 105, 107, 121.
128. The County Board decision upholding the Assessor’s 2008 value for the fee lots in Sand Creek was not supported by substantial evidence. Supra, ¶ 107.
129. Taxpayers presented sufficient credible evidence at the County Board hearing, as reflected by the County Board Record, to overcome the presumption of validity in favor of the Assessor’s 2008 value for the fee lots in Sand Creek, and the Assessor failed to adequately defend her value determinations. Having reached these conclusions, the question remains as to whether the appropriate 2008 fair market value for the fee lots in Sand Creek can be determined from the present County Board Record. It is our conclusion such question can be answered, within a range, in the affirmative.
130. The testimony of, and calculations by, Mr. Jenkins, as reflected by the County Board Record, were based on information provided to him by the Assessor’s office as to the 2008 fair market value of lots in the vicinity of Sand Creek. His testimony and calculations indicated a value per acre for vacant rural land in Johnson County from as low as $13,492 for property located in Indian Valley to as high as $24,000 for property located in Emerald Park. Supra, ¶¶ 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33.
131. Ms. Buffington, a Buffalo real estate broker, testified vacant rural land had recently sold in Johnson County for between $17,159 and $26,133 per acre. Supra, ¶ 42.
132. Ms. Smith, a former Wyoming county assessor, offered her opinion the one-acre fee lots in Sand Creek should have been valued in 2008 in a range of $15,000 to $28,000. Supra, ¶¶ 52, 53.
133. The County Board Record thus contains sufficient credible evidence to support a 2008 fair market value determination by the Assessor on remand for the fee lots in Sand Creek of between $13,492, and $28,000.
134. One final assertion by the Assessor requires consideration.
135. The Assessor argued, in effect, that even if Taxpayers had an exempt intangible interest of some nature through purchase of a fee lot in Sand Creek, they failed to properly file, pursuant to Department Rules, the requisite forms with the Assessor describing the intangible interest, and requesting such interest be exempt from taxation. Supra, ¶¶ 71, 79.
136. The Assessor based her assertion the filing of an intangible interest exemption was required on the Department Rules, Chapter 14, Property Tax Exemption Standards, and in particular Section 10 thereof pertaining to intangibles. Supra, ¶¶ 79, 101.
137. This appeal concerns the 2008 fair market value of fee lots in Sand Creek which value, by statute, the Assessor was required to determine as of January 1, 2008. Supra, ¶ 91. The Department Rules, Chapter 14, § 10, upon which the Assessor attempted to rely, did not in fact, become effective until May 21, 2008, and were, therefore, not in effect on the statutory assessment date of January 1st. The Department Rules actually became effective only six days before May 27, 2008, the indicated “Date Mailed” on the 2008 Notices of Assessment for the Sand Creek fee lots. Supra, ¶¶ 23, 101.
138. Chapter 14 of the Department Rules, in particular Section 10, on property tax exemptions and intangibles, not being in effect on January 1, 2008, were therefore not applicable to the 2008 valuation process for fee lots in Sand Creek.
139. It is as well fairly obvious from a thorough reading of Chapter 14 § 10, such rule even after its May 21, 2008, effective date, would not be applicable to individuals who simply own shares of stock or a membership in an association. Such a conclusion is particularly clear from the requirements set out in Chapter 14 §§ 10(h.)(ii.) and (j.) which anticipate the exemption of intangibles owned by a “taxpayer’s company,” not intangible interests such as memberships in associations held by individuals. Supra, ¶ 101.
140. The Department Rules further require requests for exemption be filed “on forms provided by the appropriate assessing jurisdiction” in this case the county assessor. Wyoming Department of Revenue Rules, Chapter 14 § 10(h.)(i.). The County Board Record is completely devoid of any indication the Assessor had even attempted to provide such required forms. Supra, ¶ 101.
141. It should also be noted Chapter 14 §10 sets out no time frame or deadline for filing an exemption request. The rule, §10(h)(i), simply states “[r]equests for exemption shall be timely filed” and the Assessor pointed to no other time requirement. Supra, ¶ 101.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED the Johnson County Board of Equalization Order affirming the Assessor’s 2008 valuation of Taxpayers’ property is reversed, and this matter remanded to the Johnson County Assessor for determination of a 2008 fair market value between $13,492 and $28,000 for each of the one-acre fee lots in the Sand Creek Ranch Conservation Community except Lots 21, 25, and 81.
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §16-3-114 and Rule 12, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by this decision may seek judicial review in the appropriate district court by filing a petition for review within 30 days of the date of this decision.
DATED this day of March, 2010.
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
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Thomas D. Roberts, Chairman
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ATTEST: Steven D. Olmstead, Vice-Chairman
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Wendy J. Soto, Executive Secretary